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NOTES
Personal Rights as an Emerging Approach to
Equal Protection: Automobile Financial
Responsibility Laws and the Right to Drive
Focusing on recent Supreme Court decisions, the author examines
new developments in equal protection analysis. Although inconsisten-
cies in Court language frustrate easy categorization, the author discerns
a recent trend away from the traditional equal protection tests toward a
hybrid approach being applied to an emerging category of "personal
rights." Throughout the Note the author devotes extensive analysis to
automobile financial responsibility statutes to illustrate the operation of
the various approaches the Court has applied to equal protection
problems.
I. INTRODUCTION
T RADITIONALLY, the Supreme Court has utilized a two-tiered
equal protection scheme, requiring the existence of a compelling
state interest to validate statutes which involve either the creation
of a suspect classification or the infringement of a fundamental
right, while merely requiring the existence of a rational basis to
validate all other statutes.' Recently the Court has indicated that
in deciding equal protection cases involving the alleged infringe-
ment of rights falling just outside of the fundamental rights cate-
gory, referred to here, for want of a better term, as "personal
rights,"' it will no longer automatically defer to the determination
of state legislatures by presuming the constitutionality of challenged
statutes.' The Court, in so doing, has apparently departed from the
3 See notes 52-57 infra & accompanying text.
2 The focus of this Note is on the operation and effect of the personal rights approach
to equal protection problems. An attempt will not be made here to describe in detail
what individual rights may be deemed to be "personal rights." Such rights are obviously
significant enough to warrant at least some protection under the equal protection
clause, falling somewhere on the scale of constitutional protection between "economic"
rights and "fundamental" rights. Any attempt to define just what are personal rights
is hampered by the lack of clear definitional criteria for fundamental rights. See notes
72-73 infra. It is at least arguable, however, that such important interests as driving,
education, housing and the receipt of welfare benefits fall within the aegis of personal
rights. See notes 161-62 infra & accompanying text. In any event, even though the
categories of rights suggested here lack dear definitional standards, the Court's approach
to equal protection seems to fall into three somewhat distinct operational groups, each
having characteristic factual patterns.
2 See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois,
405 U.S. 645 (1972); Bisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971).
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two-tiered equal protection scheme, where the choice of the test to
be applied virtually decided the outcome of the case, and is heading
toward a more flexible approach to equal protection questions.4
This Note will review the Court's prior treatment of equal protec-
tion and will posit and describe the new personal rights approach
the Court now seems to be developing. So that the impact and
operation of this new approach may be fully understood, this Note
will consider in detail the application of the traditional tests and
the personal rights approach to automobile financial responsibility
laws.
II. FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY LAWS
In an attempt to solve some of the serious problems surround-
ing the compensation of automobile accident victims, all fifty states
and the District of Columbia have enacted some form of financial
responsibility statute.' By requiring every person who may be found
legally responsible for damages arising from an automobile accident
to show proof of his ability to satisfy an adverse judgment, should
one be rendered, these laws increase the likelihood of compensation
for injuries caused by careless drivers.6
The basic purpose of state financial responsibility statutes is to
indemnify injured members of the public against damage caused by
automobiles.7 Upon the occurrence of an automobile accident in-
4 See Note, New Tenets in Old Houses: Changing Concepts of Equal Protection in
Lindsey v. Normet, 58 VA. L. REv. 930, 937-46 (1972).
5 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4509.09-.99 (Page 1965) [hereinafter
cited as O.R.C.]. Most states have virtually identical financial responsibility statutes,
which, for the most part, are patterned after the provisions of the Uniform Motor-
Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE ch. 7 (1962 version).
6 Many state financial responsibility statutes, in an attempt to insure that the accident
victim is compensated, also provide a fund for unsatisfied judgments. These funds
are accumulated from registration fees and assessments. A driver with an unsatisfied
judgment arising from an automobile accident can apply to the court for payment out
of that fund. Other states require, instead, that insurers provide uninsured motorist
coverage. See Hickley v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 239 F. Supp. 109, 111 (E. D. Tenn.
1965); Woodroof, A Jurisprudential Look at Automobile Insurance Reform, 5
CREIGHTON L. REV. 7, 35 (1971).
7In Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971), Mr. Justice White, in discussing
the Arizona court's interpretation of the purpose of the Arizona financial responsibility
statute, declared that the "sole emphasis in the Act is one of providing leverage for the
collection of damages from drivers who either admit that they are at fault or are
adjudged negligent." Id. at 646-47. After setting forth decisions of several other
state courts, he noted that this purpose was "by no means unusual." Id. at 644-45 n.11
and cases cited therein. A survey of state legislation suggests that the early financial
responsibility laws were designed not only to assure the compensation of accident vic-
tims, but also to aid in accident prevention. The expressed purposes for these original
statutes can be classified into three broad categories: (1) segregating the bad driver,
PERSONAL RIGHTS
volving personal injury or property damage in excess of a statutory
amount, the operators of the motor vehicles involved are required to
file with the appropriate state official a written report of the acci-
dent.' The report must be made within a designated period of time,
and failure to comply results in suspension of the operator's license
and vehicle registration.9 When in receipt of the accident report
the state official will determine an appropriate amount sufficient to
satisfy any judgment for damages against the operator."° Should
the security not be posted within a certain period of time thereafter,
the license and registration of the defaulting operator will be re-
voked." The security requirement is imposed without respect to
fault, although, as will be seen, recent case law requires that some
preliminary finding of probable fault be made.' Though the se-
curity requirement may generally be satisfied by cash or securities,
thus preventing or decreasing automobile accidents; (2) compelling the bad driver to
insure, thus increasing the proportion of insured cars and drivers; and (3) procuring
payment of past damages. While the purposes of the statutes may have at one time
included those enumerated above, today's financial responsibility statutes are concerned
only with indemnifying injured members of the public against damages caused by
financially irresponsible drivers. See Legislation, A Survey of Financial Responsibility
Laws and Compensation of Traffic Victims: A Proposal for Reform, 21 VAND. L REV.
1050 (1968). See also Aberg, Effects of and Problems Arising from Financial
Responsibility Laws, 1943 INs. LJ. 72. (1943).; Feinsinger, The Operation of Finan-
cial Responsibility Law, 3 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 519 (1936); Grad, Recent Devel-
opments in Automobile Accident Compensation, 50 CoLUM. L REv. 300 (1950).
And while these other so-called "purposes" may indeed be indirect results of the broad
compensatory purpose of the statutes, they are not a necessary part of the financial
responsibility scheme. Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 280-81, 380 P.2d
136, 14041 (1963); People v. Nothaus, 147 Colo. 210, 215, 363 P.2d 180, 183
(1961). See note 17 infra.
8In a majority of states, the statutory amount is $100. Nevada is one of the
exceptions and does not require an accident report unless the injury or damage is in
excess of $250. NEV. REV. STAT. § 485.190 (1961). Some states, on the other
hand, have no minimum statutory amount. For example, the Ohio Financial Respon-
sibility Law, O.R.C. § 4509.06, provides that the driver of any motor vehicle which is
in any manner involved in a motor vehicle accident shall forward a written accident
report to the registrar of motor vehicles within 30 days of that accident.
9 Normally, when both parties are insured there is no necessity to make a report.
Moreover, in practice, the mandatory filing period is not strictly enforced. In Ohio,
for example, the Bureau of Motor Vehicles notifies the delinquent party and will not
suspend a license until at least two notices are sent and disregarded.
10 In Ohio, for example, this amount is determined by the registrar of motor
vehicles. O.R.C. § 4509.12. Practically speaking, all that is required by the states is
a minimum amount of insurance coverage to meet this provision. The end result,
however, is that the minimum coverage is frequently insufficient to satisfy the resulting
judgment.
11 Some states permit the limited restoration of the operators license and registra-
tion where driving is necessary for occupation or livelihood. E.g., MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 9.2204(1) (1968 Revision).
12 See notes 41-49 infra & accompanying text.
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the vast majority of operators satisfy the requirement by proof of
liability insurance coverage."3 Moreover, in virtually all states, the
security requirement is terminated by exoneration settlement, or the
lapse of a statutory period in which suit has not been filed.' 4 The
statutes also require proof of future financial responsibility as a
prerequisite to returning operator licenses to persons who have had
their licenses suspended for failure to post security or for a poor
driving record. 5
Although strongly supported by the insurance industry,'" the fi-
ancial responsibility laws have come under vigorous attack for their
alleged failure to achieve their intended purpose 7 and for their al
leged unconstitutionality. The latter question appeared to be settled
in favor of the statutes as state and lower federal courts almost uni-
formly upheld the laws in the face of attacks, under the due process
and equal protection clauses. 8  Recently, however, in Bell v. Bur-
13 See Legislation, supra note 7, at 1052-54.
14 See, e.g., O.R.C. § 4509.29, which provides:
Upon the expiration of two years from the date of any accident for which
a security deposit has been made, any security remaining on deposit shall
be returned to the depositor or to his personal representative if an affidavit
or other evidence satisfactory to the registrar of motor vehicles has been filed:
(A) That no action for damages arising out of the accident for which
deposit was made, begun within two years after the date of the accident, is
pending against the person on whose behalf the deposit was made;
(B) That there does not exist any unpaid judgment rendered against
any such person in such an action.
15 Proof of future financial responsibility may be given by filing a bond, a
certificate of insurance, or a certificate of deposit of money or securities. E.g., O.R.C.
§ 4509.45. Interestingly, the financial responsibility statutes of 22 states require
proof of future financial responsibility not only from serious traffic offenders, but on
the basis of involvement in any accident. Legislation, supra note 7, at 1053.
I's The private insurance companies have long supported the financial responsibility
statutes since they indirectly force one to insure. Moreover, during the past 15 years,
the writing of surety bonds has become a lucrative business. Insurance companies,
however, have also strongly opposed any type of compulsory scheme that would force
them to insure "high risk" drivers. See KEETON & O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION
FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 91-102 (1965). Recently, however, the American Insurance
Association has begun to promote various "no-fault" insurance schemes, apparently
foreseeing even greater profit in some form of no-fault scheme. Berry, No-Fault
Automobile Insurance: An Abolition of the Tort Concept, 25 OKLA. L REv. 83 (1972).
Some commentaries allege that the insurance companies are promoting no-fault for
their own profit by attempting to force an end to personal injury litigation. See Lewis,
As I See It, TRIAL, Sept.-Oct., 1971, at 57.
17 Indeed, as early as 1937, the original financial responsibility statutes were criti-
cized as ineffective, and as a result, many states adopted new policies which placed lesser
emphasis on the safety measures of the statutes, such as quarantining the bad driver by
forcing him to prove financial responsibility, and greater emphasis on the compensation
of the accident victim. See Grad, supra note 7.
18See Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 1011 (1954).
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son,19 the United States Supreme Court revived the issue by holding
that the operation of financial responsibility laws must comport with
procedural due process standards by affording a prior hearing on
liability.
Although Bell did not radically depart from traditional due
process analysis, the Court's action could have broad significance,
not only for existing financial responsibility schemes, but also for
other legislation which affects analogous personal rights. Now that
the Court has revived the due process question, it may proceed to
consider such legislation under developing equal protection analysis.
To illustrate the operation of the developing equal protection doc-
trines, the Note will trace the court challenges to financial respon-
sibility statutes and will analyze some of the questions likely to be
raised in the future.
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
STATUTES
A. Due Process
Although it is well settled that regulation of public highways
under the state police power is a proper governmental activity in
the interest of public health, welfare, and safety,20 the fourteenth
19402 U.S. 535 (1971).
20 In Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941), the Supreme Court declared that finan-
cial responsibility statutes were valid exercises of state police power, providing "an en-
forcement of permissible state policy touching highway safety." Id. at 37.
Recently, however, in Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971), the Court held
that the section of the Arizona Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act which dealt
with the discharge of bankruptcy was constitutionally invalid since the section conflicted
with the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1970). The Court concluded that
Reiiz had "no authoritative effect to the extent that [it is] inconsistent with the con-
trolling princip!e that any state legislation which frustrates the full effectiveness of fed-
eral law is rendered invalid by the Supremacy Clause." 402 U.S. at 652. Even after
Perz, however, financial responsibility statutes are still valid exercises of state police
power so long as their provisions do not conflict with established federal law.
State and lower federal courts have also upheld the validity of financial responsi-
bility statutes. For examp!e, in Sharp v. Dep't of Public Safety, 114 So. 2d 121 (La. Ct.
App. 1959), the Louisiana Court of Appeals affirmed a lower state court which held that
the Louisiana Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law was a valid exercise of the state
police power. The court agreed with the majority of states and declared that:
[5]uch enactments are sustained under the police power and the compelling
public interest of the States to provide some remedy for the uncompensated
victims of automobile accidents and thereby to protect the users of the high-
ways and the general public affected by the extensive use of motor vehicles
in this motorized age. Id. at 123.
Accord, Reutzel v. State, 290 Minn. 88, 186 N.W.2d 521 (1971); State v. Finley, 198
Kan. 585, 426 P.2d 251 (1967); Berberian v. Lussier, 87 R.I., 226, 139 A.2d 869
(1958); Doyle v. Kahl, 242 Iowa 153, 46 N.W.2d 52 (1951); Escobedo v. State Dept.
of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal. 2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1950); Ragland v. Wallace, 80 Ohio
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amendment requires that such regulation be consistent with due
process."1 Until recently, a great majority of state courts viewed
financial responsibility statutes as largely unrestricted by the four-
teenth amendment, holding that a license to drive and use the high-
ways was a mere privilege, the right to revoke the privilege being a
condition precedent to granting it.2
Thus, the early approach to the constitutional validity of the
financial responsibility laws was grounded upon the dichotomy of
right versus privilege.23 The due process issue centered around the
question of whether a pre-suspension hearing was required, with the
vast majority of courts holding that the suspension of a driver's
license without a prior hearing did not amount to a taking of prop-
erty in the due process sense.24 Courts embracing this position rea-
soned that if a driver's license represented a mere privilege and not
a property right, its regulation, issuance, and suspension could be
left within the discretion of an administrator.25
A few courts characterized driving as a right. The result of
such a categorization, however, is far from clear. For example, in
App. 210, 70 N.E.2d 118 (Ct. App. 1946). But cf. People v. Nothaus, 147 Colo.
210, 363 P.2d 180 (1961).
21 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). See notes 41-49 infra & accompanying
text.
2 2 E.g., Gillaspie v. Dep't of Public Safety, 152 Tex. 259, 259 S.W.2d 177 (1953).
Accord, Johnson v. Sanchez, 67 N.M. 41, 351 P.2d 449 (1960); State v. Stehlek, 262
Wis. 642, 56 N.W.2d 514 (1953); Hadden v. Aitken, 156 Neb. 215, 55 N.W.2d
620 (1952); Doyle v. Kahl, 242 Iowa 153, 46 N.W.2d 52 (1951); Goodwin v. Su-
perior Court of Yavapai County, 68 Ariz. 108, 201 P.2d 124 (1948); Larr v. Dignan,
317 Mich. 121, 26 N.W.2d 872 (1947). Contra People v. Nothaus, 147 Colo. 210,
363 P.2d 180 (1961); Escobedo v. State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal. 2d 870, 222
P.2d 1 (1950).
23 The right versus privilege approach, followed by most courts up to the 1950's,
including those courts addressing themselves to the constitutionality of financial respon-
sibility statutes, involved a distinction between constitutionally protected rights of pri-
vate citizens and constitutionally unprotected privileges, An early example of this
approach was McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892),
wherein the Court upheld the dismissal of a police officer for violating a regulation
prohibiting political activity, declaring that "the petitioner may have a constitutional
right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." Id. at 220,
29 N.E. at 517. See also Baisky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954).
24 An excellent example of the application and effect of the right versus privilege
dichotomy on the financial responsibility laws appeared in Nutler v. State Rd. Comm'n.,
119 W. Va. 312, 193 S.E. 549 (1937), wherein the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia stated that:
The operation of a motor vehicle on the public highways is not a national
right, nor is license to do so a contract, or property right, in a Constitutional
sense. It is merely a conditional privilege which may be suspended or re-
voked without notice or an opportunity to be heard.... Id. at 552.
25 E.g. Commissioner v. Funk, 323 Pa. 390, 186 A. 65 (1936).
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Escobedo v. State Department of Motor Vehicles,26 where an
operator's license was suspended without a hearing pursuant to the
state financial responsibility statute, the Supreme Court of California
spoke positively of the right to drive, declaring that -[t]he use of
highways for purposes of travel and transportation is not a mere
privilege, but a common and fundamental right of which the public
and individuals cannot rightfully be deprived."2 7  However, the
Court in Escobedo went on to uphold the validity of the statute,
noting that the right to drive was subject to regulation under the
state police power and that "[sjuspension of the license without
prior hearing but subject to subsequent judicial review did not vio-
late due process if reasonably justified by a compelling public in-
terest," which the court found in the burden which would be en-
gendered by requiring a hearing prior to suspension.2 8
On the other hand, the Colorado Supreme Court, in People v.
Nothaus,20 declared that the provision of that state's financial re-
sponsibility statute which allowed summary suspension of driver's
licenses and registrations without a prior hearing for failure to de-
posit security was a violation of procedural due process. The court
declared that the right to make use of the public highways is "in-
alienable," and that every citizen has full freedom to travel from
place to place in the enjoyment of life and liberty30
The Nothaus court conceded that a citizen must meet reasonable
standards of fitness and competence to drive a motor vehicle, and
that it is the province of the legislature to establish these standards.
The court held, however, that once such standards are established,
revocation or suspension cannot be accomplished "without notice
to the party affected and without an opportunity for him to be heard
on the question of whether sufficient grounds exist to warrant a
revocation of his right to drive .... I'l To reach this conclusion,
the court employed the concept of vested rights, in which the use
of property is viewed as inseparable from the property right itself,
stating that "property, within the meaning of the due process clause,
2635 Cal. 2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1950).
27Id. at 875, 222 P.2d at 5. Accord, Wall v. King, 206 F.2d 878, 882 (1st Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 915 (1954); Berberia v. Lussier, 87 R.I. 226, 139 A.2d
869 (1958); Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S.E. 579 (1930).
28 35 Cal. 2d at 876, 222, P.2d at 5-6.
29 147 Colo. 210, 363 P.2d 180 (1961).
SOld. at 214, 363 P.2d at 182.
31 Id. at 215, 363 P.2d at 182.
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includes the right to make full use of the property when one has
an inalienable right to acquire."32
Another case which described the use of the public highways as
a right was Schecter v. Killingsworth.3 3  Schecter recognized, as did
Escobedo, that this right was subject to reasonable regulation under
the state police power. 4 The court, however, avoided the question
of whether the exercise of the police power justified license sus-
pension without a prior hearing by construing the statute so as to
require a pre-suspension hearing at which the existence of possible
liability was to be determined.3 5
Therefore, although it was clear that when driving was held to
be merely a privilege a pre-suspension hearing would not be re-
quired, the effect of a holding that driving was a right was far from
settled.
In any event, the majority of subsequent state court decisions
declined to follow Escobedo, Nothaus, and Schecter which held that
driving was a right."6 It should be noted, however, that many states
added to their financial responsibility statutes provisions for a hear-
ing upon request.37
32 Id. The court also noted that the requirement that drivers' licenses be suspended
absent a showing of the ability to indemnify the other party was not related to the pub-
lic safety, health, morals or welfare, but rather was intended to "bring about the posting
of security for the payment of a private obligation. . . . The public gets no protection
whatever from the deposit of such security." Id. at 216, 363 P.2d at 183. The impli-
cation from this latter statement is that the state police power could not justify the im-
position of such a restriction. Although it is true that the purpose of financial responsi-
bility laws is not public safety, see note 7 supra & accompanying text, this does not
mean that such laws can not be upheld within the state's police power. See note 20
supra & accompanying text. Furthermore, it is questionable whether the "public" re-
ceives no protection from a provision that was intended to benefit so many of its
members.
3393 Ariz. 273, 380 P.2d 136 (1963).
34 Id. at 280, 380 P.2d at 140. The court noted also that "the social objective of
preventing financial hardship' and possible reliance upon the welfare agencies is a per-
missible goal of police action." Id. at 281, 380 P.2d at 141.
35 Id. at 283-84, 380 P.2d at 142-43.
3 6 In State v. Finley, 198 Kan. 585, 426 P.2d 251 (1967), the Supreme Court of
Kansas noted that the Nothaus decision represented the minority view, and declared
that the operation of a motor vehicle upon the public streets and highways was not a
natural right, but a privilege subject to reasonable state regulation. Accord, Thurman
v. State Dep't of Pub. Safety, 222 Ga. 843, 152 S.E.2d 884 (1967); Jones v. Kirkman,
138 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1962).
87E.g., TMENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1202 (1968 Replacement), which provides in
pertinent part:
a. The commissioner shall administer and enforce the provisions of this
chapter and may make rules and regulations necessary for its administration
and shall provide for hearings upon request of persons aggrieved by orders
or acts of the commissioner under the provisions of this chapter provided that
such requests are made with sixty (60) days, following such order or act
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It is apparent that all the courts which initially considered the
constitutionality of financial responsibility laws focused narrowly up-
on whether the use of the highways was a right or a privilege. The
right/privilege dichotomy, however, was replaced as a method of
constitutional analysis when the United States Supreme Court
adopted a new position which recognized that if there was a "sub-
stantial interest" involved in a particular entitlement, all facets of
procedural due process must be observed before that interest might
be infringed. 8
Application of the substantial interest approach to due process
problems is most apparent in the flood of litigation instigated in the
1960's involving the administration and termination of public as-
sistance benefits. In confronting these problems, the Supreme Court
declared that due process safeguards must be provided where such
benefits are to be terminated, regardless of whether the benefits are
categorized a right or privilege. Goldberg v. Kelly 9 marked the
culmination of the right versus privilege debate. In Goldberg pub-
lic assistance benefits were terminated without prior notice and op-
portunity for hearing being afforded to the recipient. The district
court held that only a pre-termination evidentiary hearing would
satisfy the due process requirement. In affirming the district court
view, the Supreme Court declared that public assistance benefits are
a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive
them, and thus any notion of right or privilege is meaningless. In
view of the fact that a recipient of public assistance benefits is likely
to suffer "grievous loss" if those benefits are terminated, procedural
due process must be afforded prior to termination. The Court made
it quite clear that the recipient's interest involved in Goldberg, that
is, avoiding the loss of benefits, dearly outweighed any state interest
in summary adjudication or preservation of state funds.4' Thus,
and failure to make such request within the time specified shall without ex-
ception constitute a waiver of such right.
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39.6-67 (Supp. 1971).
38 See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-75 (1972).
s9 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
4oSpeaking for the Goldberg Court, Mr. Justice Brennan declared that:
The constitutional challenge cannot be answered by an argument that
public assistance benefits are "a 'privilege' and not a 'right'" (since] ...
(r]elevant constitutional restraints apply as much to the withdrawal of public
assistance benefits as to disqualification for unemployment compensation...
or to denial of a tax exemption.., or to discharge from public employment.
The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient
is influenced by the extent to which he may be "condemned to suffer grievous
loss" ... and depends upon whether the recipient's interest in avoiding that
loss outweighs the governmental interests in summary adjudication.
1972]
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under this approach the command of the due process clause is
viewed in terms of a balancing between private and governmental
interests.
The notion of substantial interest was applied to the administra-
tion of state financial responsibility statutes by the Supreme Court
in the recent case of Bell v. Burson.41 There, the Court declared
that procedural due process will be satisfied only if prior to suspen-
sion of a driver's license pursuant to a financial responsibility statute
there is an inquiry into the likelihood of there being judgments ren-
dered against the licensee in the amounts being claimed. The sub-
stance of that command is that prior to suspension there must be a
determination of probable fault.
The petitioner in Bell was a clergyman whose ministry required
him to travel by car in order to cover three rural Georgia communi-
ties. During the course of such travel, Bell was involved in an acci-
dent in which a young girl rode her bicycle into the side of his auto-
mobile. Pursuant to the Georgia financial responsibility statute,42
the child's parents filed an accident report with state authorities stat-
ing that their daughter had suffered substantial injuries for which
they claimed damages of $5,000. Petitioner Bell was thereafter in-
formed by the state that unless he was covered by a liability insur-
ance policy in effect on the date of the accident he must either file
a bond or cash security of $5,000 or suffer suspension of his opera-
tor's license. Bell requested an administrative hearing on the mat-
ter, asserting that he was not liable since the accident was unavoid-
able, and stating also that he would be seriously handicapped in his
ministry by a suspension of his license. At the administrative hear-
ing, Bell's proffer of evidence on liability was rejected, and he was
given 30 days in which to comply with the security requirement or
face suspension. The Georgia Court of Appeals subsequently up-
Id. at 262 (citations omitted). See Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337
(1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963).
Goldberg came at the end of a long line of cases from the 1950's and early 1960's
which recognized the flexibility of-due process standards and expanded the protection
offered personal interests. See, e.g., Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951), (Frankfurter, J., concurring) : "But 'due process,' unlike
some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time,
place and circumstances." See generally, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404-05
(1963); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968).
41402 U.S. 535 (1971).
4 2 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 92A-601 to 621 (Supp. 1970).
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held the administrative determination43 and certiorari was granted
by the United States Supreme Court upon the denial by the Georgia
Supreme Court to consider the matter further.44
Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for a unanimous Court,4 5 recog-
nized that just as in the other recent due process cases, the statutory
entitlement to drive may be essential in day-to-day living.46 As such,
suspension of issued licenses, like the termination of public assist-
ance benefits, involves state action that affects substantial interests
of the licensee. In Bell, the Court had no problem finding that the
driver's interest outweighed the state interest in saving the expense
of expanded hearings and disagreed with the contention that con-
sideration of liability Was irrelevant to the scheme of the financial
responsibility statute.
Thus, Bell clears away much of the indecision created by the
application of the right/privilege dichotomy to financial responsibil-
ity laws.47 It is now clear that due process requires a hearing prior
to the suspension of a driver's license pursuant to a financial respon-
sibility statute at which time there must be a determination of
whether there is a reasonable possibility of judgment being ren-
dered against the licensee as a result of the accident in question.
Although the Court in Bell was willing to accept alternative proce-
dures to a full evidentiary hearing for a determinationf of probable
fault, its command was clear: licenses are not to be taken away
without that procedural due process required by the fourteenth
amendment.48
Bell indicates the willingness of the Supreme Court to scrutinize
financial responsibility statutes under the fourteenth amendment.
The Court expressly found that the interest involved in Bell was
worthy of due process protection, a position which had found little
43 121 Ga. App. 418, 174 S.E.2d 235 (1970).
44400 U.S. 963 (1970).
4 5 Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices
Douglas, Harlan, Stewart, White and Marshall joined. Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Black and Blackmun concurred in the result.
46402 U.S. at 539.
4 7 See notes 22-37 supra & accompanying text.
4 8 Mr. Justice Brennan suggested that the state of Georgia could adopt various
alternative plans such as compulsory insurance or unsatisfied judgment funds instead
of its then existing financial responsibility statute, but nonetheless upheld the statute
as a whole. The Court's only mandate was to include a hearing prior to suspension of
an operator's license. Mr. Justice Brennan summarized that the Court held "only that
the failure of the present Georgia scheme to afford the petitioner a prior hearing on
liability of the nature we have defined denied him procedural due process in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment." 402 U.S. at 543.
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support earlier. Although that result in itself is significant to the
extent that states must now satisfy a meaningful due process burden
in the administration of their financial responsibility laws,49 the real
significance of Bell is arguably that the Supreme Court has reopened
the entire question of the constitutional validity of those laws. In-
deed, if the interest in Bell was worthy of protection under the due
process clause, should not that interest also fall within the ambit of
the equal protection clause? That question too had been previously
foreclosed, but given the Court's willingness in Bell to apply four-
teenth amendment standards, reconsideration of financial responsi-
bility laws under the equal protection clause is within the realm of
possibility.
B. Equal Protection
Although states enjoy a fairly broad scope of discretion in en-
acting laws which create classifications among their citizens,' the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment dictates that
such classifications are valid only so long as all and only those per-
sons who are similarly situated are treated equally with respect to
the purpose of the law.5' The Supreme Court has applied two tests
for measuring legislative classifications against the requirements of
the equal protection clause. Under the first, the traditional test,
the classification involved must be reasonable and bear some ration-
al relationship to a legitimate state end.52 This is commonly known
today as the test for non-suspect classifications.5" In applying this
test, the courts have generally presumed the constitutionality of the
statute.14 Under the second test, the Court has adopted an attitude
of active and critical scrutiny of statutory classifications touching on
49 Regardless of administrative difficulty and financial burden, the states will nec-
essarily have to implement a meaningful pre-suspension hearing procedure. Although
the Court did not speak directly to the content of such hearings to be provided, it is
reasonable to assume that a licensee will have a right to present any probative evidence
on the question of fault.
50 Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
51 Id. See generally Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L.
REv. 1065, 1076-87 (1969); Tussman & Ten Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws,
37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 346 (1949).
52McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969). See notes
110-21 infra & accompanying text.
53 Classifications which are based solely on alienage, nationality, or race are termed
suspect classifications. See notes 60-62 infra & accompanying text.
54See Developments, supra note 51, at 1087.
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fundamental rights or involving suspect classifications.55 Under
this standard of strict scrutiny the normal presumption of con-
stitutionality is reversed, and the state bears the burden of estab-
lishing that a compelling state interest is promoted by the classifi-
cation.56 The state must also demonstrate that there is in fact no
less onerous alternative means of accomplishing the stated purpose
of the law.17  It is submitted, however, that there may now be a
third approach for regulations involving "personal rights," where
the Court has taken an active role in attempting to find the requisite
rational relationship instead of presuming its existence. 58
Implicit in the statutory scheme of financial responsibility laws
is the creation of a classification among citizens of the state. By
requiring proof of ability to respond in damages from those drivers
who may potentially be held liable for an accident, the statutes
create a classification between drivers who are financially respon-
sible, that is, drivers who post security, and those who, failing to
post security, are financially irresponsible. The remainder of this
Note will scrutinize the validity of this classification under the
various equal protection tests.
1. The Compelling Interest Test: Suspect Classifications and
Fundamental Rights.- Financial responsibility statutes are coercive
in that they depend for their effectiveness upon the suspension of
drivers' licenses. But suspension may be avoided in any particular
case by either posting security or demonstrating liability insurance
coverage. Thus the indigent driver who can afford neither security
nor insurance will face suspension - and this without a conclusive
determination of liability59 - while the rich driver will not. It is
arguable, therefore, that the classification actually created by finan-
cial responsibility laws is not one between financially responsible
and financially irresponsible drivers, but rather between rich and
poor. Advocates of this position would argue that this classification
55See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967).
56 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 638 (1969). Unlike the traditional
test, any legitimate interest that the state may have had in a particular classification
does not of itself satisfy the burden of justification where a suspect classification or
fundamental right is involved. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
5 7 See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 399 (1971); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 498 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89,
96 (1965).
5 8 See notes 124-49 infra & accompanying text.
59Bell v.'Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), requires only that there be a preliminary
determination as to potential liability.
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should be subject to strict judicial scrutiny. For this to be the case,
the classification must either be suspect or infringe upon a funda-
mental right.
Classifications based on race,6" ancestry,61 and alienage62 have
consistently been held inherently suspect by the Supreme Court. In
addition, classifications based on wealth have been disfavored, 63 and
strictly scrutinized by the Court.64  However, in all cases where the
Supreme Court has subjected classifications based on wealth to the
stricter standard of review, some fundamental right had been im-
paired.65 Indeed, no Supreme Court case has held that a classifica-
tion drawn along the lines of wealth is suspect when no funda-
mental right has been infringed.6 And the Court has recently
60 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184 (1964); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
61 See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
6 2 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish &
Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
63See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Douglas
v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
64McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969) (dictum).
65 E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to counsel); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956) (right to transcript on appeal). See Parker v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp.
1068, 1079 (D. Md. 1972). The California Supreme Court, however, in Serrano v.
Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971), recently reversed
a lower court's dismissal on demurrer of a complaint alleging that the California
public school financing system, based on local property taxes, was violative of equal
protection. After strictly scrutinizing the financing system and the classification it
created, the court found that the system discriminated on the basis of wealth, held that
education was a "fundamental interest," and discerned no compelling state purpose
necessitating the present method of financing. Id. at 589, 604, 610, 487, P.2d at
1244, 1255, 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604, 615, 619. Some commentators have interpreted
Serrano as declaring that wealth is a suspect classification. See, Comment, Educational
Financing, Equal Protection of the Laws, and the Supreme Court, 70 MICH. L REV.
1324, 1342 (1972). Such a reading may, however, be unjustified. After discussing
the Supreme Court's disfavored treatment of wealth classifications, Serrano expressly
noted that "[ujntil the present time wealth classifications have been invalidated only
in conjunction with a limited number of fundamental interests. ... 5 Cal. 3d at
604, 487 P.2d at 1255, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615. Then, the court, noting that education
had never been held to be a fundamental interest, went on to so hold. Therefore,
although admittedly Serrano expanded the category of rights deemed "fundamental,"
it provides no support for the contention that wealth alone is inherently suspect. See
Comment, The Evolution of Equal Protection - Education, Municipal Services and
Wealth, 7 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 105, 131 n.111 (1972). Moreover,
the very cases used by the court in Serrano to establish wealth as a disfavored basis for
statutory classification were cases involving impairment of fundamental rights in ad-
dition to classifications based on wealth.
6 6 But See Cruz v. Hauck, 404 U.S. 59, 65 (1971) (Douglas J., concurring).
Recently, the United States Supreme Court, in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365
(1971), declared that the mere existence of a suspect classification was sufficient for
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refused to treat wealth alone, without the concomitant infringe-
ment of a fundamental right, as the basis for the creation of a sus-
pect classification.
67
Therefore, assuming arguendo that financial responsibility laws
discriminate on the basis of wealth, in order for such a classifica-
tion to be suspect and thus cause the compelling interest test to be
applied it is necessary to demonstrate that such laws impair a funda-
mental right. The impairment of a fundamental right alone, how-
ever, without the existence of a suspect classification, is sufficient to
trigger strict judicial scrutiny.6 8 As a result, the application of the
compelling interest test to financial responsibility laws depends ulti-
mately and completely on whether the right to drive is fundamen-
tal.
To date no court has gone so far as to recognize the existence
of a fundamental right to drive. It is true that in discussing the
validity of financial responsibility laws under the due process clause,
although the vast majority of state courts denominated driving a
mere privilege, a few state courts did hold driving to be a right or
liberty.69 It cannot be said, however, that such a holding, in a con-
text unrelated to equal protection, is at all indicative that driving is
courts to apply a strict standard of review to a legislative classification and require that
the states demonstrate the existence of a compelling interest for the classification. In
Graham, the Court struck down a discriminatory statute involving state participation
in the denial of welfare benefits to aliens. In a unanimous decision, the Court found
that the classification created by a fifteen year residency requirement for aliens, imposed
as a condition to receiving public assistance benefits, was inherently suspect and, as
such, was subject to strict judicial review whether or not a fundamental right was
impaired. Id. at 376. Although holding that no fundamental right need be infringed
upon in order to strike a suspect classification, the classifications recognized in
Graham - race, nationality and alienage - were those, and only those long held
inherently suspect. Thus, an attempt to extend Graham to classifications based on
wealth is improper since wealth is deemed a suspect classification only when a funda-
mental right is impaired.
67James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). Valtierra involved a provision of the
California Constitution which required referendum approval prior to the development
or construction of low cost housing, the enforcement of which had been enjoined by a
three-judge district court as being violative of equal protection. 313 F. Supp. 1 (N.D.
Cal. 1970). The three-judge court based its holding on Hunter v. Ericson, 393 U.S.
385 (1969), which had held an amendment to the Akron city charter, requiring
referendum approval for any ordinance regulating real estate on the basis of race,
color, religion, or national origin to be violative of equal protection. In reversing the
judgment of the three-judge court, the Supreme Court distinguished Hunter on the
grounds that the Akron referendum rested on distinctions based on race, which is
inherently suspect and subject to strict scrutiny, while the California referendum did
not rest upon such a distinction. The Court noted that "[t]he present case could be
affirmed only by extending Hunter, and this we decline to do." 402 U.S. at 141. See
Parker v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp. 1068, 1079-80 (D. Md. 1972).
6 8 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
69 See notes 22-37 supra & accompanying text.
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a fundamental right. ° In addition, although the Supreme Court
has characterized driving as an "important interest,"7' it has not yet
held it to be a fundamental right.72  And the Court does not pre-
sently seem anxious to expand the category of fundamental rights.73
Therefore, although classifications based on wealth are disfa-
vored, they apparently are not inherently suspect, and, although
driving is an important interest, it has not been and is not likely to
become a fundamental right. This would seem to foreclose applica-
tion of the compelling interest test to state financial responsibility
laws, even assuming that the classification they create is between
rich and poor.74
70 Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (receipt of welfare benefits
was an important right which could not be terminated without according procedural
due process to the recipient) with Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)
(application of the traditional, rational basis test to determine whether state welfare
regulation violated equal protection).
71Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
72 Cf. note 70 supra. To date the Supreme Court has held few interests to be
"fundamental." These include the right to travel interstate, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969); the right to vote, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966); and the right to fair criminal procedure, Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956);
and the right to procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535
(1942). The Court, however, has not clearly articulated those characteristics which
render an interest fundamental. It has been suggested that notions of extreme personal
detriment and particular societal value underlie the fundamental right concept. See
The Evolution of Equal Protection, supra note 65 at 115-22. Recent decisions, however,
have suggested that whether an interest is fundamental may depend on the existence
of a constitutionally protected right. See Lindsey v. Norme, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970); Parker v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp.
1068, 1076-77 (D. Md. 1972). See generally, Educational Financing, supra note 65
at 1339-40 & n.112.
73 See New Tenets in Old Houses, supra note 4 at 938; Educational Financing,
supra note 65 at 1333. The California Supreme Court has recently expanded the list
of fundamental rights, adding education. Serrar.o v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d
1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). See note 65 supra. Accord, Robinson v. Cahill,
118 N.J. Super. 223, 275, 287 A.2d 187, 214 (Super. Ct. 1972). Contra, Johnson
v. New York State Educ. Dept, 449 F.2d 871, 879 (2d Cir. 1971); Parker v. Mandel,
344 F. Supp. 1068, 1077 (D. Md. 1972). It is questionable, however, whether the
Supreme Court would agree. Cf. Burruss v. Wilkerson, 397 U.S. 44 (1970), aff'g inem.
310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969); McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969), aff'g
mem. sub nom. McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968); The Supreme
Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 38, 130 (1971). More recently, the Court
rejected the notion of a fundamental right to housing. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56
(1972). For a discussion of the probable reasons underlying the Court's reluctance to
expand the number of rights deemed fundamental, see notes 154-56 infra & ac-
companying text.
74 For an interesting discussion of the arguments, pro and con, concerning applica-
tion of the compelling interest test to classifications based on wealth in the area of
educational financing by combining the disfavored wealth classification and the sub-
stantial, but arguably not fundamental, interest in education, see Educational Financing,
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However, even were this strict standard applied to financial re-
sponsibility laws, it is not at all clear that the statutes would be
struck down. Where a statutory classification is suspect or infringes
upon a fundamental interest, it must bear a higher degree of rele-
vance to purpose than a non-suspect classification not involving
fundamental rights:75 it must be a necessary means of achieving a
legitimate state purpose.76  In other words, there must exist a com-
pelling state interest,77 the realization of which cannot be accom-
plished by less onerous means.78
The application of the compelling interest test, while seemingly
straightforward, apparently encompasses several factors, each of
which must be evaluated and weighed against the other in order to'
arrive at a final determination as to whether the statutory classifica-
tion under consideration is valid.79 In this balancing process"0 con-
sideration is given to "the facts and circumstances behind the law,
the interests which the state claims to be protecting, and the inter-
ests of those who are disadvantaged by the classification,"'" and to
whether the classification is necessary to accomplish the statutory
purpose,82 that is, whether the classification is reasonable in light of
the purpose, whether the classification, in fact, accomplishes the pur-
pose with sufficient precision, and whether there exist alternative
means for achieving the same objective in a less onerous manner8s
supra note 65, at 1346-48. See generally The Evolution of Equal Protection, supra note
65.
75 See Developments, supra note 51, at 1101-04.
76 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 196 (1964).
77 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 638 (1969).
78 See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 399 (1971); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 498 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96
(1965).
79 See The Evolution of Equal Protection, supra note 65, at 105, 113; Sager, Tight
Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent,, 21 STAN. L
REV. 767, 768, 778 (1969). See generally, Developments, supra note 51, at 1101-04.
80 The balancing process utilized by the Court is not often openly articulated. For
example, in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), in considering
the constitutionality of Virginia's poll tax requirement, the Court stated that the intto-
duction of "wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of a voter's qualifications [was
the introduction of] a capricious or irrelevant factor." Id. at 668. Though not artic-
ulated, the Court apparently balanced the state's need for revenue against the right to
vote in a free and unimpaired manner, and concluded that "the right to vote is too
precious, too fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned." Id. at 670.
81William v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
82 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
83See Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal
Protection, 1967 SuPREmE COURT REV. 39, 75 (1967); Van Alstyne, Student Academic
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Therefore, the existence or lack thereof of a "compelling" state in-
terest is, in reality, merely a shorthand way of indicating that, on
balance, the state interest does or does not outweigh the individual
interests impinged upon by the statutory classification or that the
classification is or is not necessary to the accomplishment of the stat-
utory purpose.
Logically, a decision as to whether a particular state interest is
sufficient to outweigh any individual interests involved would ap-
pear to be preliminary to determining whether the classification
created is necessary to the accomplishment of the state interest.
The Court, however, has often failed to reach the former question,
basing decisions instead on a negative answer to the latter.' On the
other hand, a finding by the Court that a classification is necessary
to accomplish a statutory purpose is not alone sufficient to uphold
the validity of the classification. Yet the fact that the classification
does accomplish the statutory purpose and that no less onerous alter-
natives exist, arguably, may be influential in determining the out-
come of the balance between the state and individual interests.
It is by no means clear which of the interests involved in the
financial responsibility situation - the state's interest in ensuring
the indemnification of automobile accident victims,85 or the individ-
ual's interest in driving - would preponderate if a balance were
struck between them." If it can be shown, however, that less oner-
ous alternatives exist, or that the classification created by financial
responsibility statutes does not, in fact, accomplish the statutory
purpose, the statute can be voided on these grounds and the bal-
ancing of the respective interests, difficult at best, will not be neces-
sary.
Freedom and the Rule-Making Powers of Public Universities: Some Constitutional
Considerations, 2 LAw IN TRANsITION Q. 1 (1965).
84 See, e.g., Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 399 (1971) (existence of less onerous
alternatives); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969) (failure
to accomplish purpose with "sufficient precision"). The approach taken by the Court
in these cases may be explained, at least partially, by the fact that a balancing of state
versus private interests is to a large extent directed by value judgments, and the
decision as to which should take precedence is therefore, highly subjective. Cf. note
153 infra. This is not as true, however, of the relevance to purpose of the classification.
A court can, to a much greater degree, objectively determine whether the classification
accomplishes the purpose or whether less onerous alternatives exist.
85 See note 7 supra & accompanying text.
86 In order for the compelling interest test to apply to financial responsibility laws,
it must be assumed either that the right to drive is fundamental, or, assuming the clas-
sification created by financial responsibility laws is one between rich and poor, that
classifications based on wealth are suspect per se. But see notes 65-74 supra & ac-
companying text. If driving were deemed to be a fundamental right, the state interest
required to overcome it would, necessarily, need to be substantial.
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A close examination of proposed alternatives to financial respon-
sibility laws reveals that, for the most part, they fall short of
effectively accomplishing the purposes underlying present financial
responsibility laws. It has been suggested that financial responsibil-
ity statutes be replaced with some form of compulsory insurance
coverage. Some of the proposed plans would simply make automo-
bile medical payments, disability and other forms of coverage, in-
cluding liability insurance, mandatory.87  New York8 8 and North
Carolina 9 have enacted pure compulsory insurance programs. Yet
they do not have the highest percentages among the states for auto-
mobile insurance coverage. Thus, a pure system of compulsory in-
surance might result in a larger number of insured motorists than
a non-compulsory system which employs the current financial re-
sponsibility mechanism, but it still leaves a substantial number of
uninsured motorists on the road.9 The administrative costs of such
compulsory programs also suggest that it would be almost impos-
sible to enforce the requirement to the degree necessary to rid the
highways of that substantial percentage. 2 Therefore, although
compulsory insurance has shortcomings in this respect, it would, by
increasing the number of insured drivers, seemingly insure the in-
demnification of automobile accident victims to a greater extent than
financial responsibility laws.
In another respect, however, compulsory insurance dearly falls
behind financial responsibility laws in attaining this legislative pur-
pose. Many financial responsibility statutes provide for additional
8 7 See, e.g., Denenberg, The Automobile Insurance Problem: Issues and Choices,
1970 INS. L.J. 455, 461 (1970). The most radical alternative proposal calls for the
complete elimination of the tort-liability system and the adoption of a total self insurance
system. See Ghiardi & Kircher, Automobile Insurance Reparations Plans: An Analysis
of Eight Existing Laws, 55 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 3 (1972); Ghiardi & Kircher, Automobile
Insurance: The Rockefeller-Stewart Plan, 37 INS. COUNSEL J. 324 (1970).
88 N.Y. VEH. & TRAFFIC LAWS § 312 (McKinney 1972).
89 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-309 (Supp. 1971).
90 Woodroof, supra note 6, at 34. For example, in the states of North Carolina
and New York approximately 10 percent of all drivers remain uninsured. U.S. DEP'T
OF TRANSPORTATION, DRIVER BEHAVIOR AND AccIDENT INVOLVEMENT: IMPLICA-
TIONS FOR TORT LIABILITY 202-05 (1970). In New York, this amounts to a full
200,000 uninsured drivers still on the road. Id. at 203. This results from the fact that
a substantial number of drivers purchase the compulsory insurance on an installment
basis and allow it to lapse after obtaining registration for their vehicles, while others
may, through inadvertence or design, allow their coverage to lapse. Id.
91 Statistics also indicate that many drivers in the compulsory insurance states pur-
chase only the minimum requirement of insurance. KEETON & O'CONNELL, BASIC
PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTO-
MOBILE INSURANCE 100 (1965).
92 U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, supra note 90 at 203.
1972]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:163
insurance to motorists, often in the form of a fund for the satisfac-
tion of unsatisfied judgments. 93 Under the compulsory insurance
programs and proposals there is no provision for unsatisfied judg-
ment funds, and, consequently, judgments received from automo-
bile accidents often remain uncollectible and unsatisfied.94 Also,
there remain the constitutional objections to compulsory insurance
raised by many commentators respecting equal protection, due pro-
cess, and the taking of private property without just compensation.95
More importantly, any alternative containing a form of compul-
sory insurance would be, in reality, more onerous than financial re-
sponsibility laws. If it is true that the indigent driver is unconsti-
tutionally discriminated against when forced to prove his ability to
respond in damages following an automobile accident or face the
suspension of his drivers license, it would be all the more so under
a compulsory insurance scheme, where the indigent driver would
have to purchase insurance as a condition precedent to obtaining a
driver's license.
The most recent variation of the compulsory plans is the so-called
"no-fault" scheme in which each driver's damages are paid by his
own insurer. At present, at least eleven jurisdictions have enacted
some form of no-fault automobile insurance.96 The majority of
the remaining states are considering various alternative forms of no-
fault insurance.17  Several of these states have incorporated compul-
93 Other state financial responsibility laws may require drivers to purchase uninsured
motorist coverage. See note 6 supra & accompanying text.
94 Woodroff, supra note 6, at 33.
95 Id. at 33-38. See KEETON & O'CONNELL, supra note 91, ch. 9.
96 CONN. LAWs, H.B. 5479 (May, 1972) (to be effective January 1, 1973);
DEL CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2118 (Supp. 1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 627.730-.741
(Supp. 1972); MD. LAws, H.B. 444 (to be effective January 1, 1973); MASS. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 90, § 34M (Supp. 1972), held constitutional in Pinnick v. Cleary,
271 N.E.2d 592 (Mass. 1971). MICH. LAWS, H.B. 5939 (to be effective in 1973);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B (Supp. 1972); N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1 to 39:6A-18, 39:6A-1 note(to be effective January 1, 1973); ORE. REV. STAT. § 523 (1971); P.R. LAWS ANN.
tit. 9, §§ 2051-65 (Supp. 1972); S.D. CoMP. LAws 58-23-6 through 58-23-8 (Supp.
1972). The Illinois no-fault statute, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 73 §§ 1065-150-.163 (Supp.
1972), was held unconstitutional in Grace v. Howlett, 51 111. 2d 479, 283 N.E.2d 474
(1972).
97 Many of the current no-fault proposals are based on either the Massachusetts
Plan, MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 90 § 34M (Supp. 1972), the Keeton-O'Connell
Basic Protection Plan, Keeton & O'Connell, Basic Protection Automobile Insurance, in
CRISIS IN CAR INSURANcE 40, 48-75 (1968), or the Federal Uniform Motor Vehicle
Insurance Act, S. 945, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). However, there are numerous
other variations of these and other no-fault plans currently being proposed. See Annot.,
42 A.L.R. 3d 229 (1972); Automobile Insurance Reparations Plans, supra note 87;
Keeton, No-Fault Insurance: A Status Report, 51 NEB. L. REv. 183 (1971); A
Symposium on No-Fault Auto Insurance - Perspectives on the Problems and the Plans,
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sory insurance as a necessary element of their no-fault scheme. 8
Such no-fault plans are, therefore, subject to the same criticisms as
pure compulsory programs so far as the achievement of the purpose
underlying financial responsibility laws is concerned. In addition,
the various no-fault schemes, both proposed and enacted, have seri-
ous shortcomings of their own in this regard.99
In the first place, the various no-fault plans have limited provi-
sions for penalizing or deterring negligent drivers by holding them
accountable to those they injure. Under the no-fault system the in-
sured's company is concerned only with the insured and not with
the other party, regardless of fault. To the extent that the tradi-
tional tort system of financial accountability acts as a deterrent to
irresponsible driving,1 ° the no-fault plans would be less effective in
maintaining public safety than present financial responsibility laws,
which hold the negligent driver accountable to injured parties.
Secondly, no-fault plans severely reduce monetary recovery for
pain and suffering and other incidental damages. 01 On the other
hand, the current financial responsibility statutes provide for the
posting of security or demonstration of liability insurance coverage
in an amount equal to a possible judgment which might be ren-
dered against the driver. This amount could, at the discretion of the
administrator, take into account a possible recovery of damages for
21 CAT-L L. REV. 259 (1972); Symposium on No-Fault Insurance, 74 W. VA. L. REV.
1 (1971). Many state legislatures, though, including Alaska, California, Colorado,
Hawaii, New York, Neveda, North Carolina and Virginia have defeated no-fault
plans in recent years. See Berry, No-Fault Automobile Insurance: An Abolition of the
Tort Concept, 25 OKLA. L REV. 83 (1972).
9SE.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2118 (Supp. 1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
627.730-.741 (Supp. 1972); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 90, § 1A (Supp. 1971).
99 It is important to note that the primary reason for promoting no-fault insurance
is to abolish tort liability either totally or substantially and thus to distribute more
evenly and fairly the cost of automobile insurance among members of the public. See
Brainard, A No-Fault Catechism: Ten Basic Questions Raised and Answered, 1972
INS. L.J. 317, 320 (1972). While no-fault is often suggested as the alternative to
present financial responsibility statutes, its purposes were not intended to be the same
as those of the financial responsibility statutes.
100 Based on studies for the Defense Research Institute, it was concluded that no-
fault would create a driving environment whereby unsafe driving habits would no
longer meet with social censure, and consequently, automobile accidents would increase.
Lawton, No.Fault: An Invitation to More Accidents, 55 MARQ. L REv. 73 (1972).
See Berry, supra note 97; Mancuso, The Unitity of the Culpability Concept in Promot-
ing Proper Driving Behavior, 55 MARQ. L REv. 85 (1972).
101 Proposed no-fault systems allow recovery for pain and suffering only under cer-
tain circumstances. Such damages may be recovered when the claim exceeds a fixed
dollar amount or when injuries are deemed "catastrophic." See Keeton & O'Connell,
Alternative Paths Toward Nonfault Automobile Insurance, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 240,
244; Hart, A Federal Answer to a Public Demand, 6 TRIAL, Oct.-Nov., 1970, at 27, 29.
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items excluded by the no-fault plans. Although the ultimate pain
and suffering award will depend upon a jury determination, an
amount approximating a recovery is likely to have been posted
pending that determination. Thus, it is diffiult to see how a no-
fault scheme, in which some damages may be eliminated, could
more effectively accomplish the state goal of insuring indemnifica-
tion than the existing financial responsibility mechanism. Indeed, it
could arguably frustrate that goal."0 2
The foregoing discussion underscores the conclusion that although
there are alternatives to the legislative classification created by the
existing financial responsibility statutes, those alternatives currently
advocated are no better suited to the basic purposes of the existing
legislation. 3
This, however, does not end the requisite analysis under the
compelling interest test. It must still be determined whether the
statutory purpose is accomplished with "sufficient precision" by the
classification created by current financial responsibility laws."0 4
Financial responsibility statutes classify between financially re-
sponsible and financially irresponsible drivers, i.e., between drivers
who demonstrate the ability to satisfy a potential adverse judgment
by posting bond or insurance, and those who, failing to do so, do
not demonstrate such ability. The operation of the statute results
in the creation of a fund, either in the form of bond or insurance,
from which potential judgments against drivers held to be liable
may be satisfied. The concomitant classification clearly aids in the
accomplishment of the purpose underlying financial responsibility
laws, as does the impetus to post security arising from the suspen-
sion of financially irresponsible drivers' licenses.0 5 However, one
important point remains: neither classifying the indigent driver as
financially irresponsible nor suspending his driver's license can en-
1'o See generally Bombaugh, The Department of Transportation's Auto Insurance
Study and Auto Accident Compensation Reform, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 207, 213-16
(1971); Brainard, supra note 184; Sargent, A Drastic Legal Change, 6 TRIAL, Oct.-
Nov., 1970, at 22, 23; Spapgenberg, The Public Attitude - Let's Not Misinterpret It,
6 TRIAL, Oct.-Nov., 1970, at 34; Comment, No Fault Insurance, 39 TENN. L. REV.
132 (1971).
103 The discussion herein of no-fault insurance was intended only to demonstrate
that it is not a substitute for financial responsibility laws. There are many advantages
to a no-fault system which are beyond the scope of the present discussion.
104See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969).
105 Insuring that the potentially liable driver posts security also has the advantage
of ensuring that accident victims will have no need, as a result of the accident, to look
to the state for public assistance.
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sure the idemnification of his accident victims.10 Therefore, as-
suming that financial responsibility laws will be strictly scrutinized
by the courts, the fact that the statutory classification does not assist
in the accomplishment of the statutory purpose to the extent that it
includes indigent drivers, would seem to be sufficient to warrant
voiding such statutes as being violative of the equal protection
clause.
It must be emphasized that this conclusion rests on the assump-
tion that the compelling interest test is applicable to financial re-
sponsibility statutes, which, as has been demonstrated, is not cur-
rently supportable. 10 7  Moreover, it further assumes that even if
strict scrutiny is applicable, the fact that no less onerous alternatives
exist which adequately accomplish the statutory purpose under con-
sideration, will have little or no effect on the Court's decision.
Since, in reality, the application of the compelling interest test in-
volves a balancing of several factors, 0 " it cannot be stated conclu-
sively that a finding as to one of them will be determinative.1°
Having determined that the compelling interest test is inappli-
cable to financial responsibility statutes, we turn now to a discussion
of whether such laws are valid under the rational basis test.
2. Traditional Equal Protection: Non-Suspect Classification.-
In reviewing legislatiye classifications under the equal protection
clause, the Court has retreated from a period of judicial activism
to one of restraint."0 Th following analysis will illustrate just
how far the Court has gone, especially in the area of economic regu-
lation, and will introduce what appears to be a new area of concern
- personal rights - wherein the Court has recently shown less
judicial restraint.
a. Economic Regulation"' - As a general rule, legislative en-
10 6 The indigent driver is not financially irresponsible because he will not pay, but
because he cannot pay. It should be pointed out, however, that short of subsidization
of the indigent driver, there is no way in which the statutory purpose under considera-
tion can be achieved as far as the indigent driver is concerned. And, as has been pointed
out, alternative proposals are, indeed, more onerous from the indigent's point of view
than current financial responsibility schemes. See note 95 supra & accomparnying text.
107 See notes 65-74 supra & accompanying text.
'
0 8 See notes 79-83 supra & accompanying text.
109 See notes 84-85 supra & accompanying text.
11o Compare Lochner v.'New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), with Madden v. Kentucky,
309 U.S. 83 (1940).
111The traditional equal protection test has been applied in all cases not involving
inherently suspect classifications or fundamental rights. As a result, it has been utilized
in a wide variety of substantive legal areas. It is, however, most closely associated with
the Court's treatment of state economic regulation. Therefore, "economic regulation"
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actments are accorded a presumption of constitutionality. 112  In ad-
dition, the Court has long held that the equal protection clause
permits the states wide discretion in enacting laws which may af-
fect different groups of citizens differently." 3  And, so long as
the distinctions drawn have some legitimate basis, a statute need
not deal with all aspects of a problem at the same time or in the
same way." 4 The equal protection clause is offended only when the
classification created rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to achiev-
ing the statutory purpose, that is, when there is no rational basis
for the statutory classification."' Indeed, in the area of economic
regulation the Court has exercised extreme restraint, investing legis-
lation with a presumption of constitutionality, and requiring merely
that classifications drawn by a challenged statute bear some rational
relationship to any imaginable legitimate state purpose. 16 In effect,
therefore, the Court has not only presumed the constitutionality of
the statute, but it has also presumed the existence of a rational basis
for the statutory classification as well." 7
Recently, in Dandridge v. Williams,"8 the Court reiterated its
is used herein as a shorthand expression covering all cases in which the rational basis
test has been applied.
112 McGowen v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
113 See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 142 (1971); McDonald v. Bd. of Elec-
tion Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 808 (1969); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220
U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
14 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 331 (1966); Railway Express
Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
11 5McGowen v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961). Consequently the burden
is on the party challenging the statute to show that there is, in fact, no reasonable basis
for its existence. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 79 (1911). See
Karst, Individious Discrimination: justice Douglas and the Return to the Natural-Due-
Process Formula, 16 U.C.L.A.L REV. 717, 733 (1969).
116 McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969); McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S.
483 (1955). See Heatherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due
Process of Law, 53 Nw. U.L. REV. 13 (1958). As a result of this extreme judicial
deference, the only significant case holding a regulatory measure violative of equal pro-
tection was Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
This exercise of judicial restraint stems from the recognition that the fourteenth
amendment does not give the federal courts "power to impose upon the states their
views of what constitutes wise economic or social policy," Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471, 486 (1970), which view is a manifestation of the Court's continuing rejec-
tion of its earlier intermeddling into state economic affairs under the guise of substantive
due process. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). Furthermore, since the
Court does not claim expertise in this area, as it does in areas of procedural due process,
its deference to legislative pronouncements is not surprising.
117 "It would seem, then, that in fiscal and regulatory matters, the Court has ... in
fact almost abandoned the task of reviewing questions of equal protection." Develop-
ments, supra note 51, at 1087.
118397 U.S. 471 (1970).
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doctrine of deference in the area of economic regulation in holding
that the Maryland public welfare program, which imposed a ceil-
ing on the amount of assistance a family could receive, regardless of
its size or actual need, did not violate the equal protection clause.
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifica-
tions made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some
"reasonable basis," it does not offend the Constitution simply be-
cause the classification "is not made with mathematical nicety or
because in practice it results in some inequality. . . .A statutory
discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably
may be conceived to justify it.
To be sure, the cases... enunciating this fundamental standard
under the Equal Protection Clause, have in the main involved state
regulation of business or industry. The administration of public
welfare assistance, by contrast, involves the most basic economic
needs of impoverished human beings. We recognize the dramat-
ically real factual difference between the cited cases and this one,
but we can find no basis for applying a different constitutional
standard .... 119
After noting the importance of welfare assistance 2 and determin-
ing nonetheless to apply the rational basis test, the Court proceeded
to examine the statutory purpose:
We need not explore all the reasons that the State advances in
justification of the regulation. It is enough that a solid foundation
for the regulation can be found in the State's legitimate interest in
encouraging employment and in avoiding discrimination between
welfare families and the families of the working poor. By com-
bining a limit on the recipient's grant with permission to retain
money earned, without reduction in the amount of the grant, Mary-
land provides an incentive to seek gainful employment. And by
keying the maximum family AFDC grants to the minimum wage
a steadily employed head of a household receives, the State main-
tains some semblance of an equitable balance between families on
welfare and those supported by an employed breadwinner.
It is true that in some AFDC families there may be no person
who is employable. It is also true that with respect to AFDC
families whose determined standard of need is below the regula-
tory maximum, and who therefore receive grants equal to the de-
termined standard, the employment incentive is absent. But the
Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State must choose
between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the
problem at all. It is enough that the State's action be rationally
based and free from invidious discrimination. The regulation be-
fore us meets that test.121
119 Id. at 484 (foomotes and citations omitted).
120See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
121 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1971) (footnotes and citations
omitted).
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It should be noted that the Dandridge Court discussed the statu-
tory purpose at great length; although applying the rational basis
test, it did not merely presume that the statute was valid under the
equal protection clause. 2' This gives the Court's recognition of
the importance of the receipt of welfare benefits added significance.
Arguably the Court was unwilling to allow this important personal
interest to be infringed without giving some consideration to the
validity of the statute. In this sense Dandridge presaged the cur-
rent trend in the Court's treatment of equal protection cases involv-
ing important personal rights.
b. Personal Rights'11 - Recently, in the area of personal rights,
the Court has been less deferential, critically scrutinizing legisla-
tive classifications so as to determine whether the requisite rational
basis actually exists. Although this change in judicial posture has
not always been clearly articulated, it is submitted that there may
now exist a modification of the traditional two-tiered equal protec-
tion scheme, 124 adding a third test, or more properly a subtest, which
falls between the two established tests. 25  Examples of the Court's
new activism can be found in recent cases involving differential
treatment of males and females in the administration of estates, 126
of married and unmarried persons in the sale or distribution of con-
traceptives,"' as well s in cases involving discriminatory treatment
accorded unmarried fathers in guardianship proceedings, 28 or illegit-
imate children in wrongful death 129 or workman's compensation
actions."30
One of the first cases involving such active review on the part of
the Court was Reed v. Reed,"' wherein the petitioner, having
122 The Court has in the past discussed legislative purposes in considering statutory
validity under the equal protection clause. However, Dandridge is significant in that
the Court dealt with the actual state interest, as opposed to conceivable purposes which
would support the constitutionality of the statute. Compare Dandridge with McDonald
v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 810-11 (1969) ("the different treatment...
may reflect a legislative determination ....") (emphasis added) and McGowen v. Mary-
land, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) ("[ilt would seem that a legislature could reasonably
find .... ) (emphasis added).
123 See note 2 supra.
124 Sei notes 52-57 supra & accompanying text.
125 See New Tenets in Old Houses, supra note 4 at 941, 945-46. Cf. Karst, supra
note 115.
126 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
127 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
128 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
129 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
13 0 Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
131404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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sought to be appointed administratrix of her son's estate, appealed
from an order granting letters of administration to her husband,
which order was based on a statutory provision which provided that
as between persons equally entitled and qualified to administer es-
tates, men must be given preference. The Court, applying the ra-
tional basis test, scrutinized the statutory purposes put forth by the
state: reducing the probate workload and avoiding intra-family con-
troversy. Although finding these purposes legitimate, the Court
invalidated the statute because it did not advance them "in a man-
ner consistent with the command of the Equal Protection Clause."' 82
Moreover, consideration of an alternative objective of the provision,
the establishment of degrees of entitlement of various classes of per-
sons in accordance with their varying degrees and kinds of relation-
ship to the intestate, did not help since "[rjegardless of their sex,
persons within any one of the enumerated classes . . .are similarly
situated with respect to that objective."' 33
Likewise, in Eisenstadt v. Baird-"4 the Court held that a state
statute prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to single persons
violated the equal protection clause since it could find no rational
basis for so limiting the prohibition. Noting that it was necessary
to determine whether there was "some ground of difference that
rationally explain[ed] the different treatment accorded married
and unmarried persons,"' 3 5 the Court thoroughly considered all pos-
sible purposes for the statute.
Significantly, the Eisenstadt Court rejected two of the three pro-
posed statutory purposes. First it refused to regard the Massachu-
setts statute as a deterrent of premarital sex or fornication since the
statute had "at best a marginal relation to the proffered objective.' 3 1 6
The Court emphasized that the statute regulated the distribution of
contraceptives for the prevention of pregnancy but not for protec-
tion from disease, and declared that the statute made no attempt to
deter married persons from engaging in illicit sexual relations with
unmarried partners. Secondly, the Court rejected the contention
that the statute was intended to serve the health needs of the com-
munity through regulation of the sale and distribution of potential-
ly harmful articles. Agreeing with the First Circuit Court of Ap-
132 Id. at 76.
133 Id. at 77.
134405 U.S. 438 (1972).
235 Id. at 447.
136 Id. at 448.
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peals that not all contraceptives were dangerous, and that if, indeed,
a physician was necessary to prescribe contraceptives, the need would
be as great for unmarried as for married persons, the Court con-
cluded that if health were the purpose, the statute would be "both
discriminatory and overbroad. ' 137
Since the statute could not be upheld as a deterrent to fornica-
tion or as a health measure, the Court next considered whether it
would be valid as a prohibition of contraception. The Court did
not reach the question whether such a purpose would contravene its
holding in Griswold v. Connecticut,1 8 for it held that irrespective
of what rights an individual may have concerning access to contra-
ceptives, those rights must be identical for both married and un-
married persons."3 9 The Court thus concluded that no rational
grounds existed for prohibiting the sale or issuance of contracep-
tives to single persons, and held that dissimilar treatment for mar-
ried and unmarried persons who are similarly situated violated the
equal protection clause.
The Court in both Reed and Eisenstadt applied the rational basis
test. However, in both cases the Court departed from the tradi-
tional equal protection approach by scrutinizing the relationship be-
tween the respective classifications and the proffered state interests
which the statutes sought to protect, rather than presuming the exis-
tence of a rational basis for the classifications. Although not articu-
lated, a new approach to equal protection questions was apparent:
an approach similar to the traditional test in that the rational basis
test was applied, but, at the same time, similar to the compelling
interest test in that the Court was strictly scrutinizing the effect of
the classification upon the achievement of the statutory purpose.
In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,'4° the dissent charag-
terized the decision as a departure from the established two-tiered
equal protection test. 141 In Weber, the Court held that a Louisiana
workmen's compensation statute which denied equal recovery rights
to dependent, unacknowledged illegitimates violated the equal pro-
137 Id. at 45 0-52.
138381 U.S. 479 (1965).
'39 405 U.S. at 452-54.
140406 U.S. 164 (1972).
141 "The Court in today's opinion, recognizing that two different standards have
been applied in equal protection cases, apparently formulates a hybrid standard which
is the basis of the decision here." Id. at 181 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
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tection clause. After determining that Levy v. Louisiana42 was ap-
licable, the Court reaffirmed the Levy reasoning. Writing for the
majority, Mr. Justice Powell noted that to be held valid under the
equal protection clause, a state statute, at a minimum, must bear
some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose, but empha-
sized that
[t]hough the latitude given state economic and social regulation
is necessarily broad, when state statutory classifications approach
sensitive and fundamental personal rights, this Court exercises a
stricter scrutiny . . . . The essential inquiry . . . is, however, in-
evitably a dual one: What legitimate state interest does the classi-
fication promote? What fundamental personal rights might the
classification endanger? 143
Under that test, the Court found nothing wrong in the state of
Louisiana's interest in protecting legitimate family relationships.
The error, however, was in the manner in which the statute pro-
moted that interest. In striking down the statute, the Court de-
clared:
The state interest in legitimate family relationships is not served
by the statute; the state interest in minimizing problems of proof
is not significantly disturbed by our decision. The inferior classi-
fication of dependent unacknowledged illegitimates bears, in this
instance, no significant relationship to those recognized purposes
of recovery which workmen's compensation statutes commendably
serve.144
Thus, the approach taken by the Court in Weber was the same
as that utilized in Reed and Eisentadt.145  In addition, though the
reason for such an approach was not articulated in those cases, 46
Weber clearly indicated that the Court was not willing to presume
the validity of legislative classifications touching upon "sensitive
142 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (wrongful death statute which denied recovery to illegiti-
mate children was struck down as violative of the equal protection clause).
143 406 U.S. at 173.
144Id. at 175.
145 It is unclear from the majority opinion in Weber, however, just what standard
was used. Mr. Justice Powell spoke of "fundamental personal rights," but cited cases
involving fundamental rights and suspect classifications. Id. at 172-73. In questioning
the relationship between the statute and the state interest, he quoted from Glona v.
American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75 (1968), that there was "no possible
rational basis... 406 U.S. at 173. And in striking down the statute, he used tradi-
tional equal protection language, i.e., "no significant relationship," id. at 175, and then
further confused the issue by concluding that "the classification is justified by no legiti-
mate state interest, compelling or otherwise." Id. at 176. Looking at what the Court
did, however, as opposed to what was said, it is clear that the Court utilized the rational
basis test, but in doing so, actively scrutinized the statute to determine whether the
requisite rational relationship existed.
14 6 But Cf. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 n.7 (1972).
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and fundamental personal rights." However, Weber did not indi-
cate what fundamental personal right was involved,'47 or how the
test it proposed differed from the compelling interest test.148 Yet an
analysis of Weber and other "personal right" cases evidences a
departure from the established two-tiered equal protection scheme.
In order to understand the significance of this new approach to
equal protection problems, it is necessary to understand precisely
how it differs from the two preexisting tests. Whenever an equal
protection question is presented, the relationship between the chal-
lenged classification and the statutory purpose is important. Un-
der the traditional test the Court merely requires that a rational
basis exist - the classification need only be rationally related to any
conceivable state interest - and, in practice, the Court has virtual-
ly presumed its existence. On the other hand, under the compell-
ing interest test the Court requires that the classification be necessary
to the accomplishment of a compelling state interest - the classifi-
cation must actually help accomplish the statutory purpose and
must do so in the least onerous manner possible - and the Court
presumes that it is not. When a personal right is infringed upon
by a statutory classification, the Court seemingly uses a hybrid ap-
proach. While it requires only that there be a rational basis, it scru-
tinizes the classification and its relation to the actual state interest,
rather than presuming the existence of a constitutionally permissible
relationship. It can, therefore, discover that the classification, in
fact, does not assist at all in the accomplishment of the purpose, and
that, as a result, no rational basis exists. Indeed, this is precisely
what happened in Reed, Eisenstadt, and Weber. While similar,149
this is not the same as the requirement under the compelling inter-
est test that the classification be necessary to the accomplishment of
the state interest. First of all, the requisite importance of the state
interest is much greater under the compelling interest test. Second-
ly, while there must be a high degree of relevance to purpose un-
der the compelling interest test, there need be only a rational rela-
tionship between the statutory classification and purpose in the per-
sonal rights area. Only when the classification does not accomplish
147 See 406 U.S. at 181. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
14 8 See note 145 supra.
149 Compare Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173 (1972) (personal
right: "We do not question the importance of [the state] interest; what we do question
is how the challenged statute will promote it") with Kramer v. Union Free School
Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969) (fundamental right: "For, assuming, arguendo, that
[the state interest is legitimate], close scrutiny of the . . . classifications demonstrates
that they do not accomplish this purpose with sufficient precision .. ").
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the purpose is the outcome under the personal rights approach and
the compelling interest test the same, for in such a case there is no
rational basis, and, a fortiori, the compelling interest test is not satis-
fied. When the classification does aid in the accomplishment of the
purpose, however, there may be a rational basis sufficient to satisfy
the personal rights approach to equal protection.150 Admittedly,
this is a fine distinction, but it is compelled by the Court's utiliza-
tion of the rational basis standard in the personal rights cases it has
recently decided. And, as we shall see, this lack of a precise defi-
nition is one of the main advantages of the personal rights approach.
Thus, a trichotomy is beginning to emerge: (1) When the clas-
sification is not suspect and does not involve a fundamental or per-
sonal right, the Court merely requires a rational basis for the clas-
sification, and in practice it presumes that one exists; (2) when the
classification touches upon a personal right, the Court still requires
only a rational basis, but it scrutinizes the statutory purpose and the
effect of the classification thereon to determine whether a rational
basis actually exists; and (3) when there is a suspect classification
or fundamental right involved, the Court requires that the classifi-
cation be more than rationally related to the purpose, i.e. that it be
necessary to the achievement of a compelling state interest. In
other words, as the interest infringed upon by the classification in-
creases in importance, so does the degree of scrutiny given by the
Court, the requisite importance of the state interest, and the requi-
site level of relevance to purpose.
Such a trichotomy may provide greater flexibility in dealing with
equal protection questions. In operation, the old two-tiered scheme
was basically rigid:' 5 ' the choice of the test to be applied essentially
determined the outcome of the case.' 52 This led to the criticism
that the Court was using the compelling interest test, and its ability
thereunder to secure added protection for interests it deemed im-
portant by identifying them as fundamental, as a means of "im-
pos[ingj its own value judgments on the nation."'153 Even if this
1'5 0 See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972); Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S.
357 (1971).
151 New Tenets in Old Houses, supra note 4, at 938.
152 Id. at 937; The Evolution of Equal Protection, supra note 65, at 113.
153 Educational Financing, supra note 65, at 1341. See Parker v. Mandel, 344 F.
Supp. 1068, 1076 (D. Md. 1972):
Few if any guidelines have been suggested by the Supreme Court for deter-
mining whether a claimed violation of the equal protection clause should be
considered under the strict scrutiny test or under the reasonable basis test A
high degree of subjectivity would appear to be involved in determining
1972]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:163
was true, however, the definition of a particular interest as funda-
mental was not without side effects. Once it had been done, any
statutory infringement of such interest had to be supported by a
compelling state interest to be valid, which is virtually equivalent to
saying that no statutory infringement would be permitted. M This
undoubtedly has led to an unwillingness to render interests "fun-
damental."' 5  In holding that education was not a fundamental
interest in a declaratory judgment action contesting the validity of
Maryland's public education financing system, a district court noted
that
[tlo hold that the strict scrutiny test applies to legislation of this
sort would be to render automatically suspect every statutory classi-
fication made by state legislatures in dealing with matters which
today occupy a substantial portion of their time and attention.
If the test which plaintiffs seek to apply is the appropriate stan-
dard here, then a state, on each occasion that a similar Fourteenth
Amendment attack were made against a statute dealing with health,
education or welfare, would be required to bear the burden of
proving the existence of a compelling state interest. This Court
cannot conclude that state legislatures are to be strait-jacketed by
such recently evolved constitutional theory in areas that have tra-
ditionally been the exclusive concern of the state.156
The emerging personal rights approach should both end the
criticism that the court is acting as a superlegislature and solve the
problems created by denominating an interest "fundamental." The
weakness of the two-tiered equal protection scheme was neither in
the tests themselves nor in the criteria necessary for their application
(the presence or absence of a fundamental right or a suspect classi-
fication), but in the operation of the tests. In practice each test
lay at an extreme: under the rational basis test a challenged statute
was presumed, virtually conclusively, to be valid; under the com-
pelling interest test, invalid. Now the Court seemingly is adopting
an approach which, while avoiding the necessity of labelling an
interest fundamental and the problems resulting therefrom, allows
it to scrutinize the statutory classification and purpose to see that
whether a subject is to be termed a fundamental interest or whether the clas-
sification is to be called suspect.
154 In addition, a vast increase in litigation may be expected to follow the creation
of a new fundamental right. For a discussion of the deluge of litigation in the lower
courts following the declaration of the right to travel interstate as fundamental, see
Note, Durational Residency Prerequisites: Receipt of State Benefits, 6 SUFFOLK I REV.
620, 625-28 (1972).
155 See New Tenets in Old Houses, supra note 4, at 930, 938; Educational Financ-
ing, supra note 65, at 1340-42. Cf. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 548-49 (1972).
156 Parker v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp. 1068, 1079 (D. Md. 1972).
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important personal interests are not arbitrarily infringed. While the
test is not new - the Court is merely putting teeth in the rational
basis test - the approach thereunder clearly is new. And while the
Court is no longer deferring absolutely to legislative enactments as
it previously did under the traditional rational basis test, it is still
presuming them valid and placing the burden on the party chal-
lenging them to prove otherwise. But it is providing that party
with the actual opportunity to do so.' For the Court to do less,
arguably, is to abdicate its role as constitutional arbiter. For it to do
more is arguably to encroach upon the prerogative of the legisla-
ture.
The main attribute of the personal rights approach, therefore,
is its flexibility. It permits the Court to balance the state interest
against the competing personal interests.'58 And assuming the state
interest preponderates, it permits the Court to ensure that the state
interest is actually furthered by the classification. In so doing, it
potentially broadens the protection accorded individuals under the
equal protection clause while holding the state to no higher a stan-
dard than under the traditional test.5 ' The flexibility of the per-
sonal rights approach is enhanced, and perhaps made possible by
the failure of the Court to precisely define its parameters. As noted
in the discussion of the recent personal rights cases, 6 ° the Court has
not yet clearly articulated what rights are to be considered "per-
sonal" or how their alleged infringement is to be treated under the
equal protection clause. The foregoing analysis of this emerging
doctrine has focused on what the Court did in these cases. What
has been said is, therefore, to some extent conjectural, and the de-
velopment of the personal rights approach must await further ac-
tion by the Court.1 1
15 7 It is in this sense the Court is using an old test with a new approach to that
test. The test is the rational basis test. However, in applying it the Court has adopted
an approach which allows it to consider all the important factors in determining
whether the equal protection clause has been satisfied.
15s See New Tenets in Okd Houses, supra note 4, at 941.
159 Of course, the fact that the Court will closely scrutinize the classification's rel-
evance to purpose will in practice impose a greater burden on the state. The degree of
relevance required, however, will be no higher.
160 See notes 145-48 supra & accompanying text.
161 Such action will hopefully clarify the criteria necessary for the existence of a
personal right. It would perhaps be advisable to equate the increased protection ac-
corded non-fundamental rights under the personal rights approach with that given to
"substantial interests" under the due process clause. See Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S-
254 (1970). Should this be done, there would be no need to use due process to solve
what are largely equal protection problems, see Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371
(1971), for fear that the utilization of equal protection theory will sweep too broadly.
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Arguably, the right to drive, though not fundamental, is impor-
tant enough to fall within the realm of "personal rights."1 a2 There-
fore, the classifications created by financial responsibility statutes
will not be presumed valid, but will have to be actually rationally
related to the purpose underlying such statutes. " '
As pointed out earlier, the classification between financially re-
sponsible and financially irresponsible drivers is directly related to
the accomplishment of the purpose underlying financial responsibil-
ity statutes, insuring the indemnification of automobile accident vic-
tims.1'6 However, under the compelling interest test it can be
argued that since the resulting classification of the financial respon-
sibility statutes does not necessarily accomplish this purpose due to
the inclusion of indigent drivers who cannot afford to post security,
the statute would fall. 165  In areas involving personal rights, how-
ever, under the rational basis test, such a consideration is not con-
trolling. Given the constitutionally permissible purpose of financial
See New Tenets in Old Houses, supra note 4, at 938-39, 944-45. Clarification is
needed also concerning the factors to be considered under the personal rights approach.
Hopefully, though, the Court will not render this approach inflexible as are the tradi-
tional and compelling interest tests. There is less need to fear such an occurrence,
however, since the very existence of an equal protection doctrine falling between these
two tests inevitably creates greater flexibility.
162 Although Reed, Eisenstadt, Weber and the other personal rights cases dealt
with interpersonal relationships, it is arguable that personal rights should include all
important individual interests. Assuming that the existence of a fundamental interest
is dependent upon the existence of a constitutionally protected right, see note 72 supra,
personal rights may encompass those interests, such as driving, which have been
recognized as being substantial, Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971), but
which fall short of being fundamental. See note 161 supra. The same would be true
for other important interests such as education, housing, and the receipt of welfare bene-
fits. The Court has recently recognized the importance of the latter two and, although
refusing to apply the compelling interest test to either, did scrutinize rather than pre-
sume the existence of a rational basis for the respective classifications. See Lindsey v.
Normer, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (housing); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)
(welfare). See generally The Evolution of Equal Protection, supra note 65; Educational
Financing, supra note 65.
163 State judicial decisons in the area of financial responsibility laws have uni-
formly upheld the classification created by the statutes, finding no denial of equal pro-
tection. See, e.g., State v. Finley, 198 Kan. 585, 426 P.2d 251 (1967); Schecter v.
Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 380 P.2d 136 (1963) (the classification created by the
statute was reasonable in light of the state's interest in protecting the public from fi-
nancial hardship). But cf. Miller v. Depuy, 307 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Pa. 1969). Al-
though Schecter and Finley reflect the holdings of virtually all prior courts, it should
be noted that those cases also found that the statutes were consistent with due process,
a proposition rejected by the Supreme Court in Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
Furthermore, these state courts apparently applied the traditional equal protection test,
and, arguably, a stricter standard is called for in light of the Supreme Court's recent
treatment of personal rights.
164 See note 105 supra & accompanying text.
165 See note 106 supra & accompanying text.
PERSONAL RIGHTS
responsibility statutes and the classification which has been created to
achieve that purpose, all that is required is the actual existence of a
rational relationship between the classification and the constitution-
ally permissible state purpose. The fact that the classification "dis-
advantages" a particular group or that it does not further the statu-
tory purpose in all respects does not, under the rational basis test,
automatically require that the statute be struck down as violative of
equal protection.166  Therefore, even if the relationship between
the classification created and purpose of financial responsbility stat-
utes is actually scrutinized, it appears, that so long as the relation-
ship need be only a rational one, the validity of the statutes will be
upheld.
It can be argued, however, that the purpose of such statutes is
not, in reality, to insure the indemnification of automobile accident
victims. 167  Assuming arguendo that other purposes do exist, analy-
sis of the relationship between those purposes and the statutory clas-
sification indicates that the statutes could still withstand constitu-
tional challenge.
(1) Segregating the bad drive, thus preventing or decreasing
automobile accidents - Under the financial responsibility statutes,
proof of financial responsibility is required only in lieu of suspen-
sion of the driver's license. That provision, until recently, operated
exclusive of any provision for proof of fault. But, since Bell v.
Burson, " " a preliminary determination as to the possibility of a judg-
ment being rendered against the licensee must be made prior to sus-
pension. Although this ensures to a larger degree that the driver
who must post security is a "bad driver," the bad driver who does
post security under the statute does not lose his driving rights and
thus is not segregated.
The operation of financial responsibility statutes thus segregate
only the driver who does not post security, who may or may not
be the "bad driver." It is reasonable to conclude, however, that
some bad drivers will be segregated. If the financial responsibility
statutes succeed in keeping some bad drivers off the road, the num-
ber of automobile accidents will correspondingly diminish. In
166 See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 142 (1971) ("But of course a lawmak-
ing procedure that 'disadvantages' a particular group does not always deny equal pro-
tection."); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 US. 471, 486-87 (1970) ("But the Equal
Protection Clause does not require that a state must choose between attacking every
aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all.").
16 7 See note 7 supra & accompanying text.
168 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971).
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other words, though not all bad drivers will be segregated, if some
are and accidents decrease, even though those segregated may be the
poor, 6" the purpose is achieved to an extent likely to satisfy the
rational basis test.170
(2) Compelling the bad driver to insure, thus increasing the
proportion of insured cars and drivers - Certainly some bad drivers
who might not have otherwise obtained insurance, do so, after hav-
ing been involved in an accident, as a result of financial responsibil-
ity statutes. Should a negligent driver fail to post security, his li-
cense will be suspended. It is not uhreasonable to suggest that
many of those drivers will insure to prevent future suspensions in
the event that they are involved in subsequent accidents.
In addition, the statutes themselves provide that drivers with
suspended licenses must show proof of financial responsibility in
order to have their licenses returned.'17  Obviously, the result is
to increase the proportion of insured cars and drivers, thereby mak-
ing available the funds of money to be used for the satisfaction of
future potential damage claims. There thus exists a direct relation-
ship between the legislative purpose and the statutory mechanism
for its accomplishment.
(3) Procuring payment of past damage - The great majority
of financial responsibility statutes include provisions for the suspen-
sion of a driver's license when a past damage judgment against the
licensee is left unpaid. 172  This provision is in addition to the sus-
pension for failure to post security or prove liability coverage. The
key to the operation of the unpaid damage judgment suspension
is the obtaining of a judgment by the injured party. Here too the
relationship between the statutory purpose and the mechanism of
classification is obvious. The fact that a judgment is obtained and
left unpaid presumably identifies the financially irresponsible
driver, who then suffers suspension of his license if the judgment
against him is not paid. The product of this provision, suspension
169 For a discussion of financial responsibility laws and classifications based on
wealth under the equal protection clause see notes 63-74 supra & accompanying text.
170 Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). See Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
171 See note 15 supra & accompanying text.
172 For example, the Ohio Financial Responsibility statute, OHIo REv. CODE ANN.
§ 4509.40 (Page 1971), provides that:
Any license, registration, and non-resident's operating privilege suspended
for nonpayment of a judgment shall remain so suspended and shall not be
renewed, nor shall any license or registration be thereafter issued in the name
of such person not previously licensed, until every such judgment is stayed,
satisfied in full ... until the person gives proof of financial responsibility ....
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of operator's license, acts to deter further withholding of payment
of the judgment to the injured party. Thus, the necessary conclu-
sion is that an equal protection attack alleging no rational relation-
ship with respect to this particular purpose will also fail since the
statute forces the financially irresponsible driver to reimburse vic-
tims injured by his negligent conduct.
Thus, under any approach to the legislative purpose for financial
responsibility laws, there exists a rational relationship between the
purpose, whatever it may be, and the ensuing classification. This is
sufficient to sustain the law's validity under the stricter standard of
review used by the Court in areas involving personal rights. The
Court does not require that the states treat all classes of their citizens
alike, but only that where there are distinctions, they must be drawn
under some form of rational basis. 7 3
IV. CONCLUSION
Financial responsibility statutes are a product of the states' de-
sire to protect their citizens from financially irresponsible drivers.
Since their inception, financial responsibility statutes have been
viewed by the vast majority of state legislatures as the most effec-
tive means of implementing that desire. Yet the courts have been
careful to see that such statutes accomplish their purpose in a con-
stitutionally permissible manner.
Acting consistently with this policy, the United States Supreme
Court, in Bell v. Burson,'74 brought driving within that class of en-
titlements denominated "substantial interests" and held that finan-
cial responsibility laws shall be governed by the due process clause.
This may be significant under the equal protection clause as well,
for driving arguably may be a personal right. The specific goal of
such laws being to insure indemnification of automobile accident
victims, the statutes necessarily create a classification between finan-
cially responsible and financially irresponsible drivers. That clas-
sification, non-suspect in character, is at the heart of the statutory
scheme, and, on its face, is not only rationally, but directly, related
'3 Clearly, if the financial responsibility statutes can withstand the strict scrutiny
of the Court under a personal rights approach, they will be valid under the traditional
"economic" equal protection test.
174402 U.S. 535 (1971). This was the Court's first direct consideration of the
financial responsibility statutes. The Court's only earlier contact with the financial
responsibility statutes was for alleged conflicts between the statutes and federal bank-
ruptcy law. See Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962); Reitz v.
Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941). Both cases, however, were later overruled in Perez v.
Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
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to the legislative purpose of the statute. To sustain the validity of
the classification, the rational basis test, even under active and criti-
cal analysis where personal rights are involved, requires no more.
Furthermore, even if it were concluded that the actual classi-
fication created by the statutes is one between rich and poor, there is
no foundation for the contention that such a classification would be
suspect and thus subject to the strict standard of judicial review.
As has been demonstrated, a rich-poor classification is not suspect
unless some fundamental right is impaired by its existence. Al-
though driving is now recognized by the Supreme Court as a sub-
stantial interest, it is not in fact a fundamental right. In addition,
the currently proposed alternatives to financial responsibility stat-
utes are no less onerous than the existing statutory scheme.
Therefore, the fact that the Court has reopened consideration of
financial responsibility laws under the due process clause - the re-
sult of significant changes in the law of due process - does not
necessarily portend reconsideration of their validity under equal pro-
tection. And should such reconsideration be undertaken, it appears
that until the Supreme Court is willing to make a crucial assump-
tion - that driving is a fundamental right - the validity of finan-
cial responsibility statutes under the equal protection clause must be
considered settled.
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